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One of the most signiﬁcant characteristics of optimizing models is that the behavioral equations
the past. This creates diﬃculties when modelling some of the business-cycle patterns widely
observed in modern economies. For example, it is not easy to obtain the delay in the response of
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation to a monetary shock. This paper shows that an optimizing monetary model
with endogenous capital, sticky prices, sticky wages, and adjustment costs of investment, can
replicate a lag in the maximum response of both output and inﬂation to an interest rate shock
when taking into account a time-to-build requirement for investment projects.
JEL codes: E12, E22, E47.
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rather than involved are typically forward looking, i.e., agents are concerned about the futureNon technical summary
This paper explores the implications of considering the time requirement for installing capital
goods in the production processes of the economy. The optimal level of capital must be decided in
advance in order to leave time for building and installation. The implications of this assumption
are discussed in the paper, mainly by examining the responses of macroeconomic variables to an
unexpected rise in the nominal interest rate. The empirical evidence has shown that if the interest
rate unexpectedly rises, investment, output, and inﬂation all gradually fall, reporting a maximum
value of their fall with certain time delay. This type of outcome is obtained in our model when
featuring rigidities in price and nominal wage setting, adjustment costs of installing capital, and
types of capital with a suﬃciently long time requirement for installation.
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ties have made a strong impact in the literature. Both their theoretical appeal as microfounded
models highly applicable in policy analysis, and their ability to explain short-run eﬀects of mon-
etary policy have contributed to their popularity among researchers. However, their dependence
on a forward-looking decision making-process makes it quite diﬃcult for these models to capture
some of the business cycle features observed in the data. In particular, models are not very suc-
cessful in replicating co-movements between the nominal interest rate and output, the existence
of a liquidity eﬀect on monetary expansions, the slightly procyclical behavior of the real wage, or
the delay in the response of output and inﬂation to a monetary shock.
The purpose of this paper relates precisely to this last well-documented fact, namely, to derive
a model that will help to reveal why responses of both output and inﬂation to monetary stimulus,
far from being immediate, delay several quarters before reaching their maximum impact. This
phenomenon has been widely investigated in recent papers using optimizing models featuring
frictions in price-setting, wage-setting, or both. A representative list of these should include Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), and Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2001).
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982), the procedure is to introduce time-to-build require-
ments for investment projects in a model with endogenous capital. The capital stock decided
today will not be utilized in the production process until several periods from today due to the
building and installation time needed. As a result, there is greater inertia in capital and invest-
ment behavior so that they take longer to respond to monetary shocks. This delay will have some
impact on productivity and costs. Since prices are typically set by looking at marginal costs,
time-to-build may also aﬀect pricing decisions in a way similar to that observed in the data: prices
(and inﬂation) respond more slowly to monetary innovations.1
Other basic features of the model are sticky prices and sticky wages on the supply side, and,
habit persistence in consumption decisions, adjustment costs of investment, and transactions-
facilitating money demand on the demand side.
The rest of the paper is divided into ﬁve sections. Section 2 describes the model. The equa-
tions governing the dynamic behavior of capital accumulation and the rate of inﬂation are derived
1A recent work by Edge (2000) has shown that the time-to-build assumption also helps capturing the liquidity
eﬀect in response to a positive money-growth shock. She used an optimizing monetary model with price stickiness
and ﬂexible wages. However, she did not report any inﬂation lag to the monetary shock. We presume this result to
be due to by the absence of a time-to-build constraint imposed on the demand for capital entering the production
function.
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parameters is carried out in section 4, while section 5 describes the consequences of taking the
time-to-build approach in the responses of the model to a monetary policy shock in a bench-
mark calibrated economy and in several other variants of this. Finally, section 6 summarizes the
conclusions.
The economy consists of continuum of households indexed by i [0,1] who are also producers.
They all share a set of preferences, transactions technology, production technology, the same
capital accumulation restrictions, and the same rigidities when setting prices and nominal wages.
Household preferences
The following constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function ranks household prefer-
ences over period t







where σ,Υ,γ > 0,a n d0 ζ 1. Utility depends on current consumption t,p r e v i o u sp e r i o d
consumption t−1, and leisure time lt. The habit formation element can be ruled out by setting








with θP > 1,
where ct(i) is the consumption of the ith single good.
Transactions technology
Households produce a single good and consume multiple goods. They use monetary services
to facilitate their transactions and save some transaction costs. The transactions technology is
represented by a function that indicates the level of transaction costs, ht, which depend positively
on the number of consumption bundles, t, and negatively on the amount of real money balances,
mt,h e l da tt h ee x c h a n g e
ht = h( t,m t)=





if t > 0
, (2)
ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 7with h0,h 1 > 0,a n d0 h2 1. The transactions-facilitating role of money is shown by the
negative signs of the partial derivative hm < 0, and the cross derivative hcm < 0.T r a n s a c t i o nc o s t
ﬁgures are given in consumption-bundle units.
Capital accumulation, time-to-build, and adjustment costs of investment
Households save part of their production to be transformed into capital to be used for future
production. Following the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), it is assumed that
installing capital goods takes time; the so-called time-to-build requirement. Thus, there is a gap
between the point when the decision is taken for the demand for capital and the point when it is
actually used in the production process; this gap is known as the time-to-build period. Following
on from Kydland and Prescott’s setup, it is assumed that types of capital with diﬀerent time-
to-build periods can simultaneously be used as production factors. Hence, there exist J diﬀerent
types of capital ranging from the one-period time-to-build type to the J-period time-to-build type.
The existence of multiple types of capital brings about situations in which many investment
projects are running simultaneously. In turn, notation becomes somewhat complicated. Gener-
alizing Kydland and Prescott’s deﬁnition for the multiple capital case, let spt(j) denote the net
increase in the stock of j-type capital that, over period t,i ss t i l lp periods from completion:
spt(j)=kt+p(j) (1 δ)kt+p−1(j), with p =1 ,...,j,
and where δ is the depreciation rate.
In period t, the choice variables on the J varieties of capital are kt+1(1),k t+2(2),...,k t+J(J) in
order to determine the capital accumulation processes s1t(1),s 2t(2),...,s Jt(J) respectively. In other
words, the time-to-build requirement makes producers decide on the j-type capital accumulation
j periods in advance.





which implies that resources for investment projects are allocated evenly throughout their time-
to-build period, as assumed in the calibration preferred by Kydland and Prescott. Then, total





A second restriction regarding capital decisions is that some adjustment costs are involved in
installing the new units of capital. Particularly, it is assumed here that these adjustment costs are
ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 8aﬀected positively by the increase in the stock of capital to be fully installed in the next period and
negatively by the current stock of capital. The functional form chosen here is linear homogeneous
on these two variables, as recommended by Hayashi (1982). Hence, the amount of adjustment
costs in period t for the installation of the j-type capital At(j) is given by the following function




Θ2 , for j =1 ,...,J
with Θ1,Θ2 > 0. Adjustment costs are measured in consumption-bundle units. The total amount






The amount of output produced in period t, yt, is obtained by employing the J-type varieties
of capital and the demand for labor nd
t within the following technology











with 0 < α < 1, υ > α,0 < Φj < 1, and
J
j=1 Φj =1 . This production function exhibits constant
returns to scale on the diﬀerentiated capital goods and on labor. Let t denote the capital bundle








which enables the production function (5) to be expressed in a convenient Cobb-Douglas style






Price and wage setting
Households sell their production in a monopolistic competition market. Then, the amount
produced yt(i) by the i-th household for period t will depend on the selling price Pt(i),t h e
aggregate price level PA
t , and aggregate output yA









2It is implicitly assumed that households can also produce the aggregate output good (by using the Dixit-Stiglitz
output aggregator technology deﬁned in the text). If so, the proﬁt-maximizing criterion leads to the demand equation
(6), and the zero-proﬁt condition leads to the Dixit-Stiglitz price level deﬁnition.













Stiglitz aggregate output taking the same aggregation scheme as for consumption goods.
According to Calvo (1983), households can set their price optimally only with a probability of
1 ηP. With a probability of ηP, their selling price will be automatically raised by the steady
state rate of inﬂation.3 In such case, households will adjust the price in accordance with the rule
Pt =( 1+π)Pt−1 with π as the steady state rate of inﬂation. In turn, the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
price level can be reformulated as follows
PA
t = (1 ηP)[Pt(i)]




where Pt(i) is the optimal selling price during period t.
In the labor market, each household supplies diﬀerentiated labor services in monopolistic com-
petition. Since capital is predetermined, labor demand is the amount needed to produce the level
of output given by the market demand eq. (6). The units of labor demand entering the produc-
tion function are bundles of diﬀerentiated labor services. A CES technology aggregates the labor








with θW > 1, and ns
t(i,z) is the amount of labor
supplied by the i-th household to the production process of the z-th household.
Just as in the goods market, the individual nominal wage Wt(i) set by the i-th household
determines the amount of labor supplied by this household to any other z-th household through









where θW is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor units, and WA
t is the ag-






. Summing over z in order to









3This departs from the original Calvo assumption of maintaining prices unchanged. The price adjusting rule
at hand was selected because it is consistent with optimal pricing in steady state. Examples of models using such
non-optimal pricing scheme are Yun (1996), and Erceg et al. (2000).
4This condition can be derived from the labor-related cost minimizing program for the diﬀerentiated labor
services. Furthermore, the aggregate nominal wage deﬁned below is obtained assuming that neither proﬁts nor
losses are made in the process.




t(z)dz is aggregate labor. In accordance to this result, the time constraint of the






t + lt =1 , (9)
with the total time normalized to 1 unit of time. Nominal wage setting also incorporates rigidities
àl aCalvo. Thus, the household can set the nominal wage optimally only under some ﬁxed
probability 1 ηW. Otherwise, with a probability ηW, the household will raise last period nominal
wage by the steady state rate of inﬂation, Wt =( 1+π)Wt−1. Consequently, the Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate nominal wage level can also be expressed as
WA
t = (1 ηW)[Wt(i)]




where Wt(i) is the optimal nominal wage in period t.
Government and household budget constraints
The government gives lump-sum transfers to households that are ﬁnanced by either increas-
ing money balances or bonds. Let us denote gt as the government transfers per household in
consumption-bundle terms, bt+1 as the amount of government bonds purchased in period t and
t ob er e i m b u r s e di np e r i o dt +1also in consumption-bundle terms per household, and rt as the
real interest rate that government bonds will yield from t to t+1. Thus, the government’s budget
constraint in consumption-bundle units per household is
gt = mt (1 + πt)−1mt−1 +( 1+rt)−1bt+1 bt.
where πt i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation during period t deﬁned as πt = PA
t /PA
t−1 1.
Let us now turn to the household budget constraint. The i-th household’s budget constraint
















t(i)+mt (1 + πt)−1mt−1 +( 1+rt)−1bt+1(i) bt(i)+ht. (11)
As shown in (11), there are three sources to raise income: output sales, labor income, and gov-
ernment transfers. Income is spent on consumption, investment, adjustment costs of investment,
labor demand payments, increasing real money holdings, on net purchases of government bonds,
and on transaction costs.
Both selling price and nominal wage vary across households depending on whether they were
optimally set or not. As a consequence, other variables are also diﬀerent among households. The
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equation (6), and speciﬁc labor demand, nd
t(i), as needed to produce yt(i). The selling price
will also aﬀect capital and investment decisions through its impact on expected future prices and
output. As a result, both xt(i) and At(i) are household speciﬁc. The nominal wage, Wt(i),w i l l
determine labor supply, ns
t(i), given the demand equation (8). Purchases of government bonds,
bt+1(i),a r ea l s os p e c i ﬁc to each household. An increase (decrease) of government bonds can be
viewed as a surplus (deﬁcit) that households register as a consequence of their decisions on the
selling price and nominal wage.5
By contrast, behavior across households is symmetric in choices regarding consumption and
money demand. Their optimizing behavior on allocating diﬀerentiated consumption goods leads to
the same level of consumption expenditure
1
0 Pt(i)ct(i)di which for all of them is equal to PA
t t.6
Thus, households will consume t consumption-bundle units. The demand for real money balances
mt also evolves symmetrically since it depends on t and the nominal interest rate as determined
by the optimizing conditions. In turn, transaction costs ht also move identically across households.
Finally, the amount of lump-sum transfers received from the government, gt, is assumed to be the
same for all households.
The overall resources constraint
A two-step derivation of the overall resources constraint will be carried out. The ﬁrst step will
be to determine the relationship between the aggregate output of the economy in consumption-
bundle units and the Dixit-Stiglitz output aggregator. Next, that result will be used to express
aggregate output in terms of production factors and equate this to aggregate demand.
The economy’s aggregate output during period t in consumption-bundle units y∗































5Either the surplus or deﬁcit obtained may be conceptually interpreted in the same way as proﬁts or losses in a
production economy constituted by optimizing ﬁrms.
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1−θP di = P
A
t ct.
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to demonstrate that the aggregate output level y∗





















































t . Using this result,
assuming that the government budget constraint is held, and inserting the deﬁnition of y∗
t obtained










= t + xA
t + AA








The economic behavior of households is determined by solving their optimizing program which
involves maximizing the sum of current and expected discounted future utility values subject
to the sequence of budget constraints, time constraints, and market demand constraints. The
optimizing program is described in the appendix to this paper.7 In this section we will examine
the resulting behavioral equations governing changes in capital accumulation and inﬂation since
the introduction of a time-to-build requirement gives rise to relevant eﬀects on their dynamic
behavior.
7In an economy with producers maximizing proﬁts as separate entities, the optimizing program would be equiv-
alent assuming that households lend their capital stock to producers in return for a rental rate. The time-to-build
requirement must also be considered inﬂuencing producer’s demand for capital.
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Assuming a maximum time-to-build requirement of J periods, the capital accumulation deci-
sions made in period t are the values of kt+1(1),k t+2(2),...,k t+J(J). As representative of any of

















where β is the household’s intertemporal discount factor, λt+j is the Lagrange multiplier of the
budget constraint in period t + j,a n dξt+j is the Lagrange multiplier of the market demand





as the real marginal cost over period
t+j.T h el a b o rd e m a n dﬁrst order condition for period t+j implies that the relationship between
ξt+j and λt+j is
ξt+j = λt+jψt+j, (13)














The ﬁrst order conditions regarding government bond purchases imply that
βpEtλt+p = Et λt
p−1
k=0
(1 + rt+k)−1 . (15)
Hence, when all the Lagrange multipliers in (14) are substituted for their value relative to λt
implied by (15), it yields after some algebra
(1/j)Et λt (1 δ)λt
j−1
k=0


























∂xt to represent the partial derivative during period t of
any g(.) function with respect to xt.
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j−1









(1 + rt+j−k) =
Et ψt+jf
t+j





Loglinearizing (16) around the steady-state solution, and neglecting products of close-to-zero num-




rt+p = Et ψfk(ψt+j + f
t+j






where variables without time subscripts denote steady-state ﬁgures and ”hat” variables repre-
sent percent deviations from steady state.9 Interpretation of (17) is quite straightforward: ex-
pected marginal cost equal to expected marginal return. On the right hand side, we see the
expected return on kt+j(j). This is what remains of the net marginal increase in production
due to the additional capital raised ψfk(ψt+j + f
t+j





kt+j(j) have been deducted. The appearance of the real marginal cost
ψt+j in (17) is a result of the prevailing monopolistic competition setup. Thus, a rise in the real
marginal cost means more costly labor, and more capital accumulation through a substitution
eﬀect. Likewise, higher expected marginal productivity of capital f
t+j
kt+j(j) will bring about more
capital accumulation to exploit its marginal return. With respect to marginal adjustment costs,
A
t+j−1
kt+j(j) has a positive sign and represents the marginal costs of having kt+j(j) installed, and
A
t+j
kt+j(j) has a negative sign, since it saves some adjustment costs for the next period.
On the left hand side there is an opportunity cost of kt+j(j) measured by the expected average
of real interest rates that the ﬁnancial asset (government bond) is yielding during the time-to-
build required for kt+j(j). Noteworthily, the introduction of the time-to-build requirement makes
a stream of interest rates matter on the optimal capital decision. As there are J diﬀerent types of
capital, total investment will be inﬂuenced by rt,E trt+1,...,E trt+J. As a result, investment will
more closely depend on a medium-term real interest rate deﬁnition rather than the short-term
value that comes in when there is no time-to-build.10
9Regarding the derivatives of the adjustment costs function in steady state appearing in (17), A
∗
k is its steady-
state derivative in any period with respect to the stock of capital of the previous period, whereas Ak is its steady
state derivative in any period with respect to the stock of capital of that same period.
10If there were no time-to-build restriction in the optimizing program, the ﬁrst order equation governing capital
accumulation would imply that
rt = ψfk(ψt + f
t
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We now depart from the ﬁrst order condition applicable to that fraction of households (1 ηP)
who were able to optimize when setting their selling price. For a representative i-th household,
the selling price ﬁrst order condition (P
foc



















For convenience, ﬁrst order condition (13) can be used to omit the Lagrange multipliers ξt+i,a n d
ﬁrst order condition (15) to omit the Lagrange multipliers λt+i. The resulting expression can be
rearranged and log-linearized to obtain
logPt(i)=βηPEt logPt+1 +( 1 βηP)logPA




t(i) is the percent change from steady state in the real marginal cost for
households who can set the price optimally. As shown in (19), the price set by these households
Pt(i) depends positively on the expected future evolution of both the aggregate price level and the
real marginal cost.
The aggregate price level equation (7) introduced in the previous section in log-linear terms
yields
logPA
t =( 1 ηP)logPt(i)+ηP logPA
t−1. (20)
By combining equations (19) and (20), deﬁning inﬂation as πt =l o gPA
t logPA
t−1, and neglecting
the constant term, it is possible to describe the inﬂation dynamics of the model as




The equation obtained is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve widely used in the literature
(see Yun (1996), King and Wolman (1996), or Goodfriend and King (1997)). Current inﬂation
depends with a positive sign on next period’s inﬂation and real marginal costs under optimal price
setting. The inﬂuence of future marginal costs on current inﬂation is almost as signiﬁcant as that
of current marginal costs, since the discount factor β is typically very close to one after calibration.
In the New Keynesian Phillips curve (21), the real marginal cost ψt(i) refers to that which
is computed when the selling price is set optimally. It is common in the literature for the real
marginal cost to be identical among producers, thus leading to the same individual and aggregate
real marginal costs. However, this result depends on a number of assumptions that are not satisﬁed
ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 16in our time-to-build model.11 Since capital is predetermined in our setup, the labor-capital ratio
depends upon the pricing conditions of each producer as does the real marginal cost. Therefore,
if prices are sticky, real marginal costs will diﬀer among producers.
A second consequence of using the time-to-build approach is that the real marginal cost is
positively aﬀected by the level of output produced. Since current capital cannot be adjusted,
more labor will be hired as more output is produced. Then, labor marginal productivity will fall
and real marginal costs will rise. Real marginal costs rise as output increases.
With no symmetry in real marginal costs, some algebra is necessary to express the inﬂation
equation depending on the aggregate real marginal cost ψ
A







marginal productivity is computed with respect to aggregate labor of the economy nA
t .T h et a s k
now is to ﬁnd the relationship between ψt(i) and ψ
A
t , in order to insert it into the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (21).




Taking into consideration that both yt(i) and yA
t are obtained by using Cobb-Douglas production
technology,12 it yields









































The loglinearized aggregate price level equation (20) implies that logPt(i) logPA
t = ηP(1














11In an optimizing monopolistic competition model with endogenous investment and price stickiness àl aCalvo,
the real marginal cost is identical across producers when the following three conditions are satisﬁed: i) capital
installation coincide in time with capital demand, ii) the adjustment costs of investment are considered outside the
producer’s optimizing program, and iii) production technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Assumptions i)
and ii) are not satisﬁed in our model. If i), ii), and iii) were satisﬁed, the real marginal costs would be independent
of both the selling price and the amount of output produced. See Yun (1996), and Christiano et al. (2001) for two
representative examples.








t +( 1− α)n
A
t .
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With falling inﬂation, the real marginal cost under optimal pricing ψt(i) is greater than the
aggregate real marginal cost ψ
A
t . We now can substitute (24) in the New Keynesian Phillips curve
(21) so as to present the inﬂation dynamic equation
πt = φ1Etπt+1 + φ2ψ
A



















depends positively on expected next period’s inﬂation, Etπt+1, and on current aggregate real
marginal costs, ψ
A
t , and negatively on the current capital bundle gap, t(i)
A
t . Note that the
discount rate attached to Etπt+1 is lower in (25) than in (21), thus implying that future aggregate
real marginal costs have less inﬂuence on inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t su n d e ro p t i m a lp r i c e s
which appear in (21). Moreover, the coeﬃcient that shows the impact of real marginal costs on
inﬂation is also lower in (25) than in (21).
The parameters of the model are calibrated to suit the impulse response functions analysis con-
ducted below. A Taylor-type monetary policy rule with the nominal interest rate as the instrument
will be shocked in the impulse-response analysis. Accordingly, some of the parameters of the model
were calibrated relying on empirical works regarding the eﬀects of interest rate shocks. The re-
quired evidence was speciﬁcally found in Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1996, 1998), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). In an attempt to generalize the
results of these authors, we would say that an annualized 1% interest rate shock has a negative
impact on both output and inﬂation, characterized by a delay of between two and six quarters
in their maximal responses. Moreover, the impact on inﬂation appears to be quantitatively low
(about one tenth of the shock) whereas output drops by about 0.5% of its value. These ﬁndings are
used below to calibrate ζ,σ, and Θ2. In addition, standard ﬁgures generally accepted in optimizing
dynamic models are adopted for the calibration of the remaining parameters.
In the utility function speciﬁcation (1), the habit formation term is set at ζ =0 .9,i no r d e rt o
induce a three-quarter lag in the maximal response of consumption to an interest rate shock. The
consumption relative risk aversion is σ =4 .0 so that the size of responses from consumption and
output to an interest rate shock is realistic (numbers reported below). The leisure relative risk
ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 18aversion coeﬃcient is set at γ =8 .0, leading to quite low elasticity of labor supply with respect
to the real wage (+0.25), which is consistent with results based on the microeconomic evidence
reported by Pencavel (1986). As for the scale parameter Υ, this is set to imply that one third
of total time is devoted to work in aggregate magnitudes. Finally, the household’s intertemporal
discount factor is β =0 .995, assuming a rate of intertemporal preference of 0.5% per quarter, that
is 2% per year.
In the transaction costs function (2), the value assigned to the constant term h0 will imply that
transaction costs take 1% of output in steady state. The ﬁgure actually selected will depend on
the number of types of capital in the model. The scale parameter h1 is set to give a steady state
ratio of real money over consumption, m/c, equal to 1.5. This criterion leads to set h1 =0 .026.
As for the real money share parameter in the transactions technology, it is set at h2 =0 .85 which
brings about an elasticity of the nominal interest rate in the money demand function equal to
0.15.
In the adjustment costs function (4), the scale parameter Θ1 =4 1 9 .8 implies that, in steady
state, adjustment costs of investment are equal to 6% of total investment, i.e., nearly 1.5% of
output. As for the elasticity parameter, Θ2,i ti ss e tΘ2 =2 .4 so that in the sticky-price, sticky-
wage calibrated model with J =4 , the peak response of investment to an interest rate shock is 6
times that of consumption and 2.6 times that of output. The capital depreciation rate is δ =0 .025
for all types of capital.
In the production function (5), the J diﬀerent types of capital have identical weights, Φj = J−1
for all j belonging to [1,...,J].13 The capital bundle share parameter in the production function
(5’) is α =0 .36. In addition, the coeﬃcient υ is set at υ =1 0 .0 so that the elasticity of substitution
between diﬀerentiated capital goods is -0.96, close to its ceiling of -1.0.
Following the empirical results by Basu and Fernald (1994), and Basu (1996), the elasticity of
substitution between diﬀerentiated consumption goods is θP =1 0 .0, implying a 10% mark-up of
price over marginal cost in steady state. The elasticity of substitution between labor services is
θW =4 .0, as suggested by Griﬃn (1992, 1996). Neither prices nor nominal wages can be adjusted
optimally with a probability equal to ηP = ηW =0 .75, as in Erceg et al. (2000). Subsequently,
both prices and wages are set optimally on average once a year.14
13Based on equipment, structures, and residential investment data, Edge (2000) estimates these weights for the
US economy in a time-to-build model with six diﬀerent types of capital.
14Christiano et al. (2001) estimate the average length of optimal price and wage contracts in the US. They report
that prices are set every 6 months, whereas wages last on average nearly a year. Smets and Wouters (2001) also
estimated these parameters in the Euro area and found optimal prices to last an average of two and a half years,
and optimal wages one year.
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α leads to the following ﬁgures: φ1 =0 .41, φ2 =0 .0348, and φ3 = 0.0196.
The last feature of the model to be calibrated is the value assigned to J,t h en u m b e ro ft y p e s
of capital classiﬁed according to their time-to-build requirement. Since this point is crucial in the
paper, we will view four diﬀerent possibilities: J =1 , J =2 , J =4 ,a n dJ =8 .A s a r e s u l t ,
we have the model ranging from a case in which there is only a simple type of capital with a
one-quarter time-to-build requirement, to one in which there are eight diﬀerent types of capital
requiring from one quarter to eight quarters to be fully installed. The next section deals with the
implications of having diﬀerent time-to-build properties on this benchmark calibrated model and
o ns e v e r a lo fi t sv a r i a n t s .
As mentioned above, the consequences of considering the time-to-build approach in the model will
be investigated by observing how the variables of the model respond to a nominal interest rate
shock. Thus, we need to deﬁne the monetary policy that is in place. Monetary authorities are
assumed to follow a monetary policy rule on the nominal interest rate instrument.15 Speciﬁcally,
the following Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing is implemented
Rt R =( 1 µ3)µ1Et−1 [πt+1 π]+( 1 µ3)µ2Et−1yt + µ3(Rt−1 R)+εt, (26)
where yt is the output gap, and εt is a white-noise nominal interest rate shock. The output gap
is deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence between current output and potential output. Potential
output is calculated in the model as the amount of output that would be produced if all the prices
and wages were fully ﬂexible to adjust optimally. Expected values of inﬂation deviations and the
output gap are considered when applying the rule since the actual values are assumed not to be
available at the time of the decision. The coeﬃcients chosen for the monetary policy rule are
µ1 =1 .5, µ2 = 0.5
4 ,a n dµ3 =0 .85.
A one-unit positive shock in (26) is considered to imply a one-unit unexpected rise in the
nominal interest rate at the time of the shock. Attention is focused on the responses of the following
variables of the model plotted in Figures 1-5: nominal interest rate (R), the capital bundle (k),
investment (x), consumption bundle (c), output (y), the capital bundle gap (kgap), real wage (w),
marginal productivity of labor (fn), the real marginal cost (ψ), and the rate of inﬂation (π). All
the variables represent aggregate magnitudes of the economy except for the capital bundle gap
15Alternatively, the monetary policy rule could be formulated with respect to a money-growth instrument. This
alternative was examined and results in the impulse response functions were found to be very similar.
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capital bundle. The numbers reported are percent deviations from steady state except for the
nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate which are level deviations from steady state values.
The impulse response functions are plotted on a 3-year time horizon, from quarter 0 to quarter
12. The monetary policy shock occurs in quarter 1.
The impact of the time-to-build approach on the business cycle properties of the model will
be analyzed by comparing cases J =1 , J =2 , J =4 ,a n dJ =8 .
Benchmark economy
Figure 1 shows the results for the benchmark model with sticky prices (ηP =0 .75), sticky
wages (ηP =0 .75), consumption habit formation, and adjustment costs of investment. Table 1
and Table 2 contain the capital bundle, investment, consumption, output, and inﬂation responses
when J =1and J =8 , respectively. As displayed in Figure 1 and reported in Tables 1 and 2,
the introduction of longer time-to-build types of capital leads to signiﬁcant changes in the overall
picture. To begin with, the capital bundle responses are smoother with longer time-to-build types
of capital. Subsequently, falls in investment are less pronounced and more gradual with some
d e l a yr e p o r t e di nt h em a x i m u mf a l l .
Consumption response barely changes in a longer time-to-build economy. In turn, the eﬀects of
the time-to-build requirement on output response are a result of its impact on investment decisions.
Declines in output, like those in investment, are more gradual and less striking in economies with
longer time-to-build types of capital. For example, output reports a maximum fall of 3.36% at the
time of the shock when J =1 , and slightly above 2% two quarters after the shock when J =4 . If
J =8 , the maximum fall of output is 1.68% of its value and occurs at both two and three quarters
after the shock.16 In turn, maximum output response to an interest rate shock registers a lag only
when the model incorporates types of capital with moderately long time-to-build requirements.
In such a case, the output response follows a u-shape pattern, consistent with the prediction
suggested by the empirical evidence.17
Wage stickiness in the labor market brings about a small and very slow fall in the real wage
which does not seem to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the time-to-build conditions prevailing in the
16These output responses may appear unrealistically strong. However, since the model is speciﬁed in quarterly
observations an interest rate shock should be multiplied by four to be expressed in conventional annualized terms.
Therefore, responses of output to a one-unit annualized interest rate shock are equivalent to those reported divided
by four. Output would therefore decline by around 0.5% when J =4or J =8 , which is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1998), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
17Since the shock was contractionary, u-shape responses take the inverse form of the hump-shape patterns typically
found after an expansionary shock.
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The eﬀect of a nominal interest rate shock on inﬂation resembles that of the real marginal costs
(see Figure 1). The capital bundle gap has little impact on inﬂation. In log-linear magnitudes,
the real marginal cost is the diﬀerence between the real wage and the marginal productivity of
labor. Of the two, it is the latter that most closely determine the response in the real marginal
cost and ultimately the response in inﬂation. The response in the marginal productivity of labor
becomes smoothed and signiﬁcantly delayed in the presence of longer time-to-build capital. The
real marginal cost follows pretty much the same pattern but in the opposite direction, falling
more gradually when the economy features longer time-to-build capital. As a result, we also
obtain a u-shape response in inﬂation to the nominal interest rate shock similar to that displayed
by output and investment (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Interestingly, the purely forward-looking
inﬂation equation (26) replicates a lag in the response of inﬂa t i o nt oa ni n t e r e s tr a t es h o c kw h e n
as u ﬃciently long time-to-build requirement is considered.
In short, output and inﬂation were found to display a u-shape response to an interest rate
shock in the benchmark calibrated model, when there are types of capital with a time-to-build
requirement exceeding a certain length.
Flexible-price economy (ηP =0 .0)
Flexible prices lead to symmetric behavior across households in terms of output, demand for
labor, and demand for capital. As a result, the capital bundle gap is always zero. Figure 2 shows
the impulse response functions to an interest rate shock. Similar responses to the sticky-price case
are reported on the demand side of the economy. Figure 2 also shows that falls in both investment
and output are more gradual and less drastic when longer time-to-build types of capital are present
in the economy.
By contrast, the supply side shows very diﬀerent patterns from the ones it displays in the
sticky-price benchmark economy. Optimal price setting behavior across all households leads to a
ﬂat real marginal cost: all the producers set prices so as to equate marginal productivity of labor
and the real wage, wA
t+i = fnA
t+i. Subsequently, a substantial drop in prices is needed to lift the
real wage up to the level of rising marginal productivity of labor. In turn, two unrealistic features
are found in the supply-side responses. First, the real wage becomes strongly countercyclical.
Second, the impact of the nominal interest rate shock on inﬂa t i o ni si m m e d i a t ea n dq u a n t i t a t i v e l y
very substantial. These two ﬁndings are robust to any time-to-build speciﬁcation. Thus, a longer
time-to-build capital in the economy only makes the real wage responses less pronounced and
slower smaller to peak, while remaining clearly countercyclical. As for inﬂation, its response is
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strong with no u-shape pattern reported.
Flexible-wage economy (ηW =0 .0)
Another variant of the model emerges from when fully ﬂexible wages are assumed. In other
words, all households can optimize when setting the nominal wage that they will receive for their
labor supply. Figure 3 displays the impulse response functions obtained in this economy.
As Figure 3 shows, the demand sector of the economy (consumption, investment, and output)
is not substantially altered when wages are ﬂexible. In the event of a nominal interest rate shock,
they all report similar falls to those that occur in the benchmark economy. Moreover, the impact
of longer time-to-build requirements seems to be the same as in the benchmark economy: both
investment and output move towards a u-shape response when longer time-to-build types of capital
are considered.
The story is on the supply side, however, quite diﬀerent. Now that all the nominal wages
are ﬂexible to adjust optimally, they move down dramatically. After a contractionary shock,
households wish to work more as consumption falls and leisure time increases. Consequently,
they set a lower nominal wage. With fully ﬂexible nominal wages, the real wage increases so
unrealistically as to become highly procyclical, dropping by 400% when J =1 .I nal o n g e rt i m e -
to-build economy, declines are not as steep and (by 130% when J =8 )but they last longer. These
severe falls in the real wage govern responses in real marginal costs and inﬂation. Hence, both
t h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s ta n di n ﬂation also report very deep falls. No delay is found to occur in the
maximum response of inﬂa t i o ne v e nw h e nJ =8 .
No adjustment-cost economy (Θ1 =0 .0)
As Figure 4 shows the absence of adjustment costs of investment gives rise to an incredibly
large responses to an nominal interest rate shock.18 The most relevant of these is the investment
response, which registers a dramatic fall at the time of the shock. Investment plunges by more
than 4000% if J =1a n db yn e a r l y9 0 0 %i fJ =8 ! These huge falls are partially transmitted to
the output responses which also report very high ﬁgures.
The consequences of such dramatic falls in investment and output spread to bring about
unrealistic responses on the supply side of the economy. As labor demand falls with output, the
marginal productivity of labor soars leading to a steep decline in the real marginal cost. As a
result, inﬂation falls severely at the time of the shock. The introduction of longer time-to-build
18This same result has been reported by Casares and McCallum (2000).
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high.
No consumption habit formation economy (ζ =0 .0)
Finally, the last variant of the benchmark economy is the economy without habit formation
in consumption preference. Figure 5 contains the impulse response functions to an interest rate
shock. As expected, the most signiﬁcant change is to be seen in consumption response which is
now somewhat greater and peaked at the time of the shock under any time-to-build speciﬁcation.
This response is persistent over time and still noticeable 12 quarters after the shock.
As the consumption lag disappears, the delay in output response relies only on the delay in
investment. Therefore, the u-shape pattern of output is no longer as marked as it was in the
benchmark economy that featured consumption habit formation.
All the variables on the supply side respond very much as they did in the benchmark economy.
Thus, the real marginal cost and the rate of inﬂation are aﬀe c t e di nt h es a m ew a yb yt h et i m e - t o -
build requirement. The eﬀect of longer time-to-build types of capital is to reduce and slow down
falls in both variables.
This paper has explored some business cycle implications of including a time-to-build require-
ment in a sticky-price-sticky-wage optimizing monetary model with endogenous investment and
adjustment costs. The setup described in the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982) was
extended so as to include in the production technology diﬀerent types of capital that varied in
their time-to-build requirement.
As installing capital goods takes time, the capital accumulation decision is made in advance
and capital cannot be adjusted to produce current output. In turn, the dynamic behavior of capital
and inﬂation are aﬀected by the time-to-build requirement. It has been demonstrated, for example,
how optimal capital depends not only on the current real interest rate but also on the expected
real interest rates during the time-to-build period. In addition, the time-to-build requirement in
a sticky-price economy leads to asymmetry of the real marginal cost across producers, which has
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on the dynamics of inﬂation.
The eﬀects of an unexpected rise in the interest rate using a Taylor-type monetary policy rule
were analyzed under several time-to-build speciﬁcations. It was found that the introduction of
longer time-to-build types of capital has relevant implications: the responses of both output and
inﬂation are smoother and delay in reaching their peak. In other words, the model replicates
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ranging from the one-quarter time-to-build capital to the eight-quarter time-to-build capital.
The process originating the u-shape responses in output and inﬂation begins with the slower
reaction of investment as capital takes longer to complete installation. In such a case, output also
responds more slowly since investment is one of its components. On the supply side, the fall in
labor is also delayed by the lag in output response. The presence of sticky wages smooths the real
wage and leaves the real marginal cost mostly determined by the marginal productivity of labor.
Consequently, the delay in labor response gives rise to delays in both the marginal productivity
of labor and the real marginal costs responses. Ultimately, inﬂation reports a lag in reaching its
peak response as optimal prices are set by looking at real marginal costs.
However, these results are not robust to three variants of the model: ﬂexible prices, ﬂexible
wages, and no adjustment costs of investment. If either prices or nominal wages are fully ﬂexible,
t h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s ta n di n ﬂa t i o nr e s p o n s e sa r em u c hg r e a t e ra n do b s e r v e da tt h et i m eo ft h e
shock, even when time-to-build requirements are in place. In a version of the model without
adjustment costs of investment the responses of all the variables to an interest rate shock are
simply unrealistically high.
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The optimizing program of a representative household consists of maximizing the sum of cur-
rent and expected discounted future utility values subject to the sequence of budget constraints,


















































for i =0 ,1,2,..., , and j =1 ,...,J.T h es o l u t i o ni np e r i o dt comprises the three constraints for































mt + βEt λt+1(1 + πt+1)−1 =0 , (m
foc
t )
λt(1 + rt)−1 + βEtλt+1 =0 , (b
foc
t+1)
where λt+i, ϕt+i,a n dξt+i are respectively the Lagrange multipliers of the budget, time, and
market demand constraints in any period t +i. If both the selling price Pt and the nominal wage
Wt can also be optimally set by the household, their respective ﬁrst order conditions are
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Time-to-build capital takes 1 quarter (J =1 ).
Responses to a unit monetary policy shock.
Quarters after the shock Capital bundle Investment Consumption Output Inﬂation
0 0 -10.12 -0.51 -3.36 -0.129
1 -0.25 -7.77 -0.79 -2.87 -0.122
2 -0.44 -5.90 -0.93 -2.41 -0.114
3 -0.58 -4.44 -0.97 -2.00 -0.106
4 -0.67 -3.30 -0.95 -1.64 -0.097
5 -0.74 -2.41 -0.89 -1.33 -0.088
6 -0.78 -1.73 -0.81 -1.08 -0.080
Table 2. Benchmark economy.
Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to 8 quarters (J =8 ).
Responses to a unit monetary policy shock.
Quarters after the shock Capital bundle Investment Consumption Output Inﬂation
0 0 -2.80 -0.51 -0.99 -0.058
1 -0.03 -3.73 -0.80 -1.50 -0.078
2 -0.08 -3.85 -0.93 -1.68 -0.088
3 -0.15 -3.57 -0.97 -1.68 -0.091
4 -0.22 -3.10 -0.94 -1.55 -0.090
5 -0.29 -2.55 -0.87 -1.37 -0.086
6 -0.35 -1.99 -0.78 -1.17 -0.079
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Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to J quarters.
Impulse response functions to a unit monetary policy shock.






















































ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 30Figure 2. Flexible-price economy (ηP =0 .0).
Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to J quarters.
Impulse response functions to a unit monetary policy shock.






















































ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 31Figure 3. Flexible-wage economy (ηW =0 .0).
Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to J quarters.
Impulse response functions to a unit monetary policy shock.























































ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 32Figure 4. No adjustment-cost economy (Θ1 =0 .0).
Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to J quarters.
Impulse response functions to a unit monetary policy shock.

























































ECB • Working Paper No 147 • May 2002 33Figure 5. No consumption habit formation economy (ζ =0 .0).
Time-to-build capital takes from 1 to J quarters.
Impulse response functions to a unit monetary policy shock.
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